China Rejects Pakistan’s SLBM Deal? Truth Behind Nuclear Missile Reports And (India VS Pakistan SLBM)
In this Article, we will briefly discuss the SLBM system and the reported discussions regarding a potential deal between Pakistan and China related to sea-based nuclear capabilities.
Introduction :
Second Strike Capability. This is the capability that assures any country that even if the Adversary destroys its basic nuclear assets in a first nuclear strike, it still retains the complete ability to respond with a nuclear counterattack. This concept is actually the foundation of deterrence. Its purpose is not to fight a war but to prevent a war. Because when both sides are assured that even after a first strike, a second strike is inevitable, then no side thinks many times before launching a first nuclear attack.
Now the question arises: how does this second strike capability come? Its most powerful and secure method is SSBN submarines. SSBN stands for Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN), referring to a nuclear-powered submarine designed to carry and launch ballistic missiles. Meaning such submarines that can carry nuclear missiles, remain hidden in deep seas, and when needed, launch nuclear missiles from there. Are these submarines not the most critical element of modern nuclear triad because of their ability to operate under the water?
The main reason why these types of submarines are so valued is precisely their ability to remain undetected by Adversary In the world, only a few countries have a complete SSBN-based nuclear triad, such as the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, and even India also possesses this capability.
Pakistan is officially a nuclear-armed state and has land-based and air-based nuclear delivery systems. Meaning the ability to deliver nuclear weapons through missiles and aircraft. But when we talk about second strike capability, Pakistan has successfully test-fired Babur-3 cruise missile which is able to launch from a submarine, The Babur-3 tests demonstrated Pakistan’s pursuit of a sea-based nuclear delivery capability, although this is different from having an operational SSBN-based deterrent. However, there is crucial difference between cruise and ballistic missiles, which should be noted.
The Babur-3 is a submarine-launched cruise missile rather than a ballistic missile. Cruise missiles generally fly through the atmosphere on a powered, guided trajectory, while ballistic missiles follow a different flight profile and can reach much higher speeds. So, when it comes to SLBMs, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, they are much more advanced than cruise ones. The real modern second strike capability comes from SSBN-equipped SLBMs.
This is the gap that Pakistan needs to fill. Pakistan currently does not have a complete SSBN-based ballistic missile capability. This means its second strike capability is not complete but limited. This limitation shows that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is still heavily dependent on land-based systems.
Pakistan’s Babur-3 has a range of 450 km, and its next variant, the Harbah missile, has a range of up to 700 km. Meaning if India conducts a nuclear attack on Pakistan and Pakistan responds using second strike capability, then Pakistan would only be able to target within a 700 km range, which is of course insufficient and cannot cover India. But if India uses the same second strike capability, India has developed the K-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile, which is reported to have a range of around 3,500 km., and India is developing another SLBM with 5000 range..
From a strategic perspective, this gap is considered a major military concern for Pakistan. Because until a country has a fully survivable nuclear force—meaning a force that can guarantee retaliation even after a first strike—its deterrence is not considered complete.
For this reason, military analysts often say that Pakistan may in the future need an SLBM-based system or more advanced submarine platforms to close this gap.
Reported China–Pakistan SLBM Discussions
Now in this context, Some reports have alleged that Pakistan discussed obtaining sea-based nuclear capabilities from China, including technology associated with SSBNs or SLBMs. However, these reports have not been publicly confirmed by either the Pakistani or Chinese governments. Meaning Pakistan has talked about acquiring this technology from China, and China has reportedly refused to provide this capability.
Circulating reports claim that in exchange for benefits Pakistan is providing to China at Gwadar Port, and for military cooperation and much more, Pakistan raised this request for technology. And China allegedly rejected this nuclear-related request because Beijing considers it extremely sensitive and geopolitically dangerous.
China’s biggest concern was related to the spread of nuclear technology. Because China is part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and if it transfers such technology indirectly, it could face severe diplomatic pressure, sanctions, and reputational damage at the global level.
And these reports say that although China continues to provide Pakistan with aircraft, submarines, infrastructure, financial assistance, and various conventional military systems, every strategic alliance has hidden limits. Meaning even in an all-weather friendship, there are red lines that cannot be crossed. And these reports also say that Pakistan had allegedly requested this capability in exchange for greater military access in Gwadar. But , let me tell you clearly that there is no confirmation of such reports. This is unverified news.
You know very well who spreads such news the most. Pakistan comes into their narratives every day, and every day they create some new story, and later it turns out to be the opposite. It is true that Pakistan needs SLBM capability.
They are claiming in their fabricated reports that China refused because it supports non-proliferation. But China has a long history of extensive conventional defense cooperation with Pakistan, including aircraft, naval platforms and other military systems.
Conclusion
Second strike capability is a core concept of modern nuclear deterrence, and its strongest form is based on SSBN-based SLBM systems, which ensure survivable nuclear retaliation even after a first strike.
At present, Pakistan has:
- Land-based missile systems
- Air-based nuclear delivery platforms
- A limited sea-based capability via the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile
However, Pakistan does not yet have a SSBN/SLBM-based second strike capability, This means Pakistan does not currently field an SSBN-based ballistic-missile deterrent comparable to those operated by established nuclear-armed states. and with a very limited nuclear deterrent compared to the regional powers and other countries.
Compared to other countries and especially India, Pakistan currently has a limited sea-based nuclear delivery capability, centered on the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile concept., which is a significant factor in its deterrence strategy and overall strategic position. Speculation about SLBM technology transfers from China seems to be based on unofficial sources only.
Separating Verified Facts From the Reported China–Pakistan Deal
Pakistan has an interest in developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent capability. Pakistan has conducted tests of the Babur-3 cruise missile for launching from submarines, but Pakistan does not possess a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine or a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)-based SLBM nuclear deterrent force.
There is no public evidence in the open-source literature verifying or substantiating reports of Pakistan seeking Chinese assistance for the provision of nuclear-powered submarines or submarine-launched ballistic missiles or that China rejected such a request. Similarly, there is no public evidence in the open-source literature verifying or substantiating reports that the talks involved an offer by Pakistan of greater access to Gwadar.
Therefore, these reports should be regarded as unsubstantiated allegations. The issue of Pakistan’s acquisition of a more survivable sea-based nuclear deterrent capability would have significant implications for the South Asian nuclear balance, but the reported China–Pakistan deal itself has not been publicly substantiated.
👉 Overall, the key point is:
to sum up everything said above, the main point is that the survivability of nuclear missiles on submarines and their carriers is a critical factor in second strike capability, which is currently lacking in the South Asian strategic balance.
So friends, what do you think about this? Do tell in the comments section.
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